We report the results of an experiment designed to measure how well asset market prices track fundamentals when the latter experience peaks and troughs. We observe greater price efficiency in markets in which fundamentals rise to a peak and then decline, than in markets in which fundamentals decline to a trough and undergo a subsequent increase. The findings demonstrate that the characteristics of the time path of the fundamental value can influence the degree of market efficiency.
have had dramatic effects on the payoffs of market participants. On the other hand, the suggestion that price bubbles and crashes are pervasive is unappealing to many economists because such mispricing is at odds with classical economic and financial theory 2 . Thus, there is an ongoing debate about whether asset prices have a tendency to deviate from fundamentals as a matter of course, or whether deviations from fundamentals are a rare, unbiased, or rather inconsequential phenomenon (Fama, 1998; Malkiel, 2003) . The conjecture that we investigate in this paper is that the tendency for an asset to track its fundamental value depends on properties of the time-profile of the fundamental, and we consider the validity of this conjecture for a particular class of experimental market.
A feature of many economic time series is that they are cyclical or seasonal, and thus experience periods of rising value followed by periods of decline, often followed again by episodes of increasing value. Despite the fact that such a structure is common, and that peaks and troughs are often optimal times to trade, markets with these properties have not to date been investigated with experimental methods. This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to directly compare, in a controlled manner, the efficiency of (i) markets for assets that experience a period of increasing, and then a period of falling, fundamentals, versus (ii) markets in which fundamentals first decline and then rise. We call the first type of market a Peak market, and the second type a Valley market. The Peak and Valley markets that we create are symmetric in the sense that the assets are traded over an equal time horizon, experience a peak or trough in fundamental values of equal magnitude compared to initial and final values, and experience their extreme fundamental value at the same time. Thus, the experiment is designed so that there is an opportunity for asymmetries in the reaction of prices to peaks and troughs in fundamentals to appear and to be identified. The existence of a pricing asymmetry would be consistent with an intuition that has been expressed by some policymakers with regard to the behavior of macroeconomic variables.
3 2 Temin and Voth (2004) have argued that during the South Sea bubble episode at least one major investor was aware that the market was in a speculative bubble. On the other hand, Pastor and Verenesi (2006) find that the runup and decline in the NASDAQ index was not indicative of a bubble. French and Poterba (1991) argue that the Japanese stock market bubble of the late 1980's cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals. Booms and crashes have been modeled both as originating from the presence of irrational trader types such as feedback traders (see for example DeLong et al., 1990) or overconfident traders (Scheinkman and Wong, 2003) as well as rational phenomena (Tirole, 1982; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003) . 3 This intuition has been voiced, for example, by former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan who in a recent interview indicated "What strikes me about the current period is it's wholly consistent with my generalized view of how important innate human characteristics are in sustaining the business cycle. I've always been concerned that in setting up an econometric model you take history irrespective of whether it's up or down, and there's an implicit judgment that the coefficients work symmetrically on the upside and downside. There is a general belief, for example, that capital gains on homes has a buoyant The use of experimental methods, as with any choice of research methodology, involves a tradeoff. The use of experimental methods restricts us to studying markets that are small in scale, in terms of time, number of traders, and monetary stakes, as well as different in trader characteristics than typical non-laboratory markets. However, experimental methods do allow the fundamental value of an asset to be unambiguously specified, observed, controlled, and compared to transaction prices. Non-experimental empirical tests of market efficiency typically involve postulating a hypothesis about the fundamental value of an asset and measuring how well prices track fundamentals under the assumption that the hypothesis governing fundamentals is correct.
Thus, tests of market efficiency in the field are in fact joint tests of price efficiency and the assumptions made on the process guiding fundamentals (Fama, 1970) . 4 In our study, market efficiency is measured with three different indicators: (a) the magnitude of the differences between price levels in the asset markets and the underlying fundamental values, (b) the consistency with which price trends reflect trends in underlying fundamentals, and (c) the difference between the timing of peaks and troughs of prices and those of fundamentals. Our design, in which the same individuals participate in four sequential markets, also allows us to study how differences between treatments, with regard to the market efficiency measures above, evolve with repeated interaction in a sequence of markets.
We find that markets that experience a peak are more efficient than markets that experience a trough. Peak markets have a stronger and more rapid tendency to converge toward fundamental pricing as traders gain more experience. Thus, in the markets we study, the likelihood that an asset market tracks fundamental value depends on the process that fundamentals follow. In other words, one environment is more conducive to pricing at fundamentals than the other, simply because of the interaction between the behavior that appears in asset markets and the particular process guiding the time path of fundamentals. The degree of market efficiency depends not only on previously identified factors such as the market institutions in place, the regulatory framework, and the number, experience level, and sophistication of traders, which are controlled for in our markets, but also on the time path of the fundamental effect on consumption going up and precisely the same on the other side. I'm beginning to question whether that premise is true" (Alan Greenspan, Sept. 17, 2007) . 4 Summers (1986) observes that many tests of the observable implications of market efficiency have low power to reject the null hypothesis of no mispricing. He writes "…certain types of inefficiency in market valuations are not likely to be detected using standard methods. This means the evidence found in many studies, that the hypothesis of efficiency cannot be rejected, should not lead us to conclude that market prices represent rational assessments of fundamental valuations. Rather, we must face the fact that most of our tests have relatively little power against certain types of market inefficiency. In particular, the hypothesis that market valuations include large persistent errors is as consistent with the available empirical evidence as is the hypothesis of market efficiency." values.
Our work builds on a substantial body of experimental work, beginning with Smith et al. (1988) , which has investigated the behavior of experimental markets for long-lived assets. The assets studied in this literature are almost exclusively finitely-lived, pay dividends at regular intervals, and are created in settings where no alternative interest-bearing investments exist. This means that the assets have fundamental values that decrease monotonically over time. 5 For this special case of declining fundamentals, the literature has yielded consistent results about the behavior of prices for assets with this particular structure. A consistent pattern of price booms, episodes of pricing at greater than fundamentals, and crashes, rapid decreases in prices, reminiscent of those believed to occur in field markets, is generally observed. As individuals accumulate experience in an identical environment, prices move closer to fundamental values (Smith et al., 1988; Dufwenberg et al., 2005; Haruvy et al., 2007) , but bubbles may re-emerge if the dividend parameters are changed (Hussam et al., 2007) in a manner that preserves the declining fundamental value property. The current study is the first experimental study, to our knowledge, in which the behavioral properties of markets experiencing a peak or trough in fundamentals are investigated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses, while section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 reports the results and section 5 briefly summarizes the main points of the study and provides some concluding remarks.
II. HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses in this paper concern the differences between two different experimental treatments, Peak and Valley, with regard to various criteria of market efficiency. As described in more detail in section three, each treatment is in effect for five experimental sessions, and in each session the market is repeated four times. Denote the lifetime of the asset in each market repetition as T periods and let t f V and t f P denote the fundamental value of the asset in period t (t = 1,…,T) in the Valley and Peak treatments, respectively. Let p mt Vi denote the observed period median transaction price in period t of market m in session i (i = 1,…,n) of the Valley treatment, and define p mt Pi analogously for the Peak treatment. Since the same traders participate in consecutive markets, the index m can be interpreted as a measure of the experience of traders.
5 Experimental studies of long-lived asset markets have focused almost exclusively on the case of monotonically decreasing fundamental values, with a few exceptions (Camerer and Weigelt, 1993; Noussair et al., 2001; Ball and Holt, 2005 ) that study assets with constant fundamental values.
Furthermore, let p m ji = (p m1 ji ,…,p mT ji ) be the 1xT vector indicating the T-period price trajectory in market m of session i of treatment j, and define f j as the 1xT vector of fundamental values in
Our market efficiency criteria measure the degree of consistency between the two series p m ji and f j in terms of three measures: (1) levels, (2) trends, and (3) timing of changes in trend.
We first compare the treatments with regard to price level inefficiency: the difference between price level and fundamentals over the life of the asset. To measure price level inefficiency, we use two measures of mispricing introduced by Haruvy and Noussair (2006) 6 . These measures are
Total Dispersion and Total Bias. They are defined as follows.
Total Dispersion is a measure of overall discrepancy between prices and fundamentals,
where larger values indicate larger differences between prices and fundamentals. Total Bias is a measure of systematic over-or under-pricing, where higher values indicate higher prices, and where a value of zero reflects equal average prices and fundamentals. The most basic question to consider is whether price levels track fundamental value to the same extent across treatments.
Hypothesis 1 is that the distribution of price level inefficiency, for a given experience level and taking each session as an observation, does not differ significantly between treatments. Table A2 in Appendix A contains the results from an analysis of treatment differences using several other measures of price deviation from fundamental value that have appeared in the experimental literature (see King et al., 1993) , Van Boening et al., 1993), or Porter and Smith, 1995 t'', so that a price peak (trough) signals that the asset's value has also reached a maximum (minimum). Larger differences indicate greater inefficiency. Hypothesis 3 is that the distribution of turning point inefficiency is the same in the two treatments.
Hypothesis 3:
The time difference between turning points of prices and turning points of fundamentals is the same in the two treatments.
We also consider the effect that repetition of the market has on the price efficiency measures. Specifically, we consider whether price efficiency improves at all with repetition in the market, and if so, whether it improves at a similar rate in both treatments. 
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TP in an analogous manner. We advance two sets of null hypotheses about the effect of repetition on inefficiency. The first set, hypothesis 4a, is that repetition has no effect on price level, trend, and turning point inefficiency. In other words, the hypothesis for Total Dispersion is that the distribution of D m j is the same as for D m-1 j . The hypothesis is evaluated for both Peak and Valley markets, and similar hypothesis are tested for the other measures of mispricing. The second set, hypothesis 4b, is that any percentage change in an inefficiency measure that occurs with experience is the same in the Peak and the Valley treatments. Specifically, we consider whether the distribution of
Hypothesis 4a: The markets exhibit the same level of inefficiency as they are repeated.
Hypothesis 4b:
The rate of change in inefficiency measures as the markets are repeated is identical in the two treatments.
III. THE EXPERIMENT a. General structure and treatments
The experiment consisted of ten experimental sessions conducted in the economics laboratory at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The sessions were conducted in English and participants were all students enrolled at Tilburg University. In each session, nine subjects traded in a sequence of four markets, each identical in parametric structure. Each market consisted of 15 periods, during which individuals could trade units of an asset. The asset's lifetime equaled the 15 periods during which the market was in operation. An experimental currency called "francs", converted to Euros at the end of the experiment, was used for all payments and transactions within the experiment. 
b. Fundamental values and initial endowments
The fundamental value of the asset arose from three sources: dividends, taxes, and a final buyout (a payment for each unit of asset held at the end of the market to the unit's owner). These were payments to or by the current owners of the asset on each unit they held. At any point in time the fundamental value was the sum of the expected future payments from all three sources.
Specifically, the fundamental value of a unit of the asset during any period was equal to the sum of the expected dividends and final buyout it would generate, minus any taxes that remained to be paid on the unit. Thus, the fundamental value of one unit of the asset at any point in time was the expected value of the stream of payments that resulted from holding the unit for the remainder of the current market. The three different sources of value were included in the design merely to induce the appropriate dynamic patterns in fundamental values 9 . The number and timing of future dividend draws, tax payments, and final buyouts in the current market was always common knowledge.
After every period, each unit of the asset paid a dividend to its current owner. Dividends were drawn independently for each period from a four-point distribution with equal probability mass at 0, 8, 28, and 60 francs. This is the same distribution that was used in the original study of Smith et al. (1988) and a number of later studies that extended this work (see for example King et al., 1993; Porter and Smith, 1995; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006) . The expected dividend in any period was thus equal to 24 francs, and the expected future dividend stream equaled 24 multiplied by the number of periods remaining in the current market. A die roll after each period determined the dividend for all units for the period. The payment of a dividend at the end of a period reduced the fundamental value by 24 francs immediately after the payment, since the number of future dividend payments decreased by one.
Certain periods of each market were tax periods. After every tax period, subjects paid a fixed inventory tax of 48 francs for each unit in their possession. In the Peak treatment, the first seven periods of each market were tax periods. In the Valley treatment, the last seven periods of each market were tax periods in sessions V1 and V2. The last eight periods were tax periods in sessions V3 -V5. The purpose of the tax periods was to create an increasing fundamental value for the periods during which the tax was in effect. During a tax period, the difference between the expected dividend to be received and the tax to be paid that period was always equal to -24.
Thus, after each tax period, the fundamental value increased by 24 francs, as the future liability on each unit of the asset decreased by 24 francs.
The third determinant of the fundamental value was the final buyout. In the Valley treatment, each unit yielded a final payment at the end of period 15 of 216 francs, in addition to any dividends and taxes that were collected and paid. In the Peak treatment, the final buyout value was implicitly zero. The final buyout value increased the fundamental value of the asset for the entire life of the asset. Its sole purpose was to ensure that the asset always had a positive fundamental value.
Thus, t f j , the fundamental value in period t of treatment j equaled
where t d and τ t j denote the dividend and the tax in effect in period t of treatment j, 15 T = is the final period of the market, and B j is the final buyout. E(d t ) = 24 for all t and both treatments. τ t j = 48 for t = 1,..,7 in the Peak treatment, for t = 8,…,15 in sessions V1 and V2, and for t = 9,…,15 in sessions V3 -V5, and τ t j = 0 at all other times. B j = 0 for Peak and B j = 216 for Valley.
Dividends and final buyout payments were added to individuals' cash balances at the time they were paid, and taxes were subtracted from cash balances at the moment they were incurred. This meant that dividend payments added to and taxes subtracted from the cash that could be used for subsequent purchases.
At the beginning of a session, each subject was assigned one of three different trader types (I, II, or III), and he remained the same type for the entire session. There were three traders of each type in each session. A trader type was defined by the initial endowment of units and cash with which a subject of that type began each market. The initial asset endowments of type I, II, and III traders were one, two and three units of the asset, respectively. In the Peak treatment, the initial cash endowments of the trader types (I, II, and III) were 1281, 1257, and 1233 francs, respectively, whereas the initial cash endowments were 1113, 921, and 729 francs for the three types in the Valley treatment.
c. Market organization and timing
In each market period, subjects could exchange units of the asset for francs among each other.
The markets were computerized and used continuous double auction trading rules (Smith, 1962) implemented with the z-Tree computer program (Fischbacher, 2007) developed at the University of Zurich. In a continuous double auction, the market is open for a fixed interval of time. At any time, any agent, who has sufficient cash or units to conclude the transaction, may submit an offer to the market. An offer specifies a price at which the agent is willing to either buy or sell a share.
Any trader with sufficient funds and units of asset to complete the transaction may accept any outstanding offer at any point in time. All offers were displayed to all agents on their computer screens. Upon acceptance of an offer, a trade was conducted and the asset and cash transferred between the transacting parties.
No short sales or borrowing were allowed. Inventories of assets and cash carried over from one period to the next so that for each individual, the quantities of cash and assets held at the beginning of period t+1 were the same as those held at the end of period t, adjusting for any dividends received and/or taxes paid.
The sequence of events in a session was as follows. The experimenter first distributed and read aloud a detailed explanation of how to make and accept offers with the electronic trading interface. This took approximately five minutes. For the next ten minutes subjects practiced trading using the interface. Activity during this phase did not count toward final earnings. After the practice phase was completed, the rest of the instructions, which described all other aspects of the experiment, were handed out and read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects then received their initial endowments of the asset and cash and the first of the four asset markets began. The initial endowments of cash and asset for a given individual were identical in each of the four markets, 10 These cash and asset endowments were chosen to approximately equalize expected earnings across all trader types and treatments. Expected earnings are equal for each of the three types within a treatment under the assumption that individuals hold their initial endowment and make for the entire trading horizon (except for sessions V1 and V2 where they differ very slightly). In the same sense, expected earnings are equal for a given type in the Peak treatment, and in sessions V3 -V5 of the Valley treatment. Actual realized earnings at the individual level depend on the distribution of asset holdings, the dividend realizations, and the trading strategies employed. The existence of types was not communicated to participants, who only knew their own initial endowments.
and thus the markets were ex ante identical, except for the prior experience level of the participants. Each of the 15 periods of a market lasted two minutes, and during these two minutes trading was possible at any time. At the end of markets one, two, and three, subjects were informed that their next task in the experiment would be to participate in another 15-period market.
A subject's entire earnings over a market were equal to the amount of cash he held at the end of the final period of that market, after the last dividend, tax and final buyout were paid. This was equal to his initial endowment of cash, plus any earnings from dividends, minus any taxes paid, plus proceeds from sales of shares, minus expenditures on purchases of shares, plus any final buyout received. A subject's earnings for the entire experiment were equal to the sum of his earnings from each of the four markets, plus an additional participation fee of five Euros. Francs were converted to Euros at a rate of 200 francs to 1 Euro and subjects were paid in cash anonymously at the end of the session. Sessions averaged 3 hours in duration and average subject earnings were 36 Euros (USD 56). In markets 1 and 2 of the Peak treatment, shown in figure 2a, prices are usually greater than fundamentals in the early periods of the market, and then operate at close to fundamentals in 11 The data on the volume of trade indicate that all of the markets were thick and active. Consider market Turnover, a measure of market activity employed in the analysis of experimental markets (King et al., 1993; Van Boening et al., 1993; Porter and Smith, 1995) . Turnover equals the total volume of trade over the T-period market horizon, divided by the total stock of units, which is the total inventory of units of asset all individuals hold. Table A2 in Appendix A reports the value of Turnover for each of the ten sessions of the experiment. The table indicates that in the Peak treatment, the average value (across sessions) of Turnover is 7.8 in market 1, and declines to 2.6 by market 4. In the Valley treatment, the average value is 7.8 in market 1, and decreases to 3.3 in market 4. These high levels of transaction activity indicate that the markets were active and that the episodes of mispricing that we observe are not a phenomenon associated with thin markets. Table 1 indicates the results of two-sided rank-sum tests of differences in Total Dispersion and Total Bias between the two treatments. The test is conducted separately for the data from each of the four markets, which correspond to four different trader experience levels.
IV. RESULTS
12 To avoid rescaling of the figures, the prices of some periods in market 1 of sessions P2 and P4 are not shown. These prices are 600, 800, and 600 in periods 7 -9 of market 1 of P2, and 800, 750, and 700 in periods 8 -10 of market 1 of P4. 13 The values of each measure for each market in each session of the Peak and Valley treatments are given in We now turn to trend inefficiency, the measure of how consistently price changes, from one period to the next, fail to be in the same direction as movements in fundamental values. We find that trend inefficiency is lower in Peak than in Valley, for markets with either inexperienced or experienced participants. Table 2 [ Inefficiency is constant or increasing from one market to the next in favor of the hypothesis that it is decreasing. However, recall that the Trend Inefficiency levels in the Valley treatment in markets one and two are greater than 50%, the value that would result if price movements were purely random, so the improvement occurs from a very low base.
Result 2: Price trends more accurately reflect underlying trends in fundamentals in Peak than in Valley markets. Trend inefficiency is greater in the Valley than in the Peak treatment. Hypothesis 2 is rejected.

Support for Result 2:
[ In sessions 2 and 4 of the Peak treatment, an interesting pattern can be seen in Figure 2a .
In market 1 of these two sessions, large bubbles are observed in roughly the middle third of the life of the asset. In market 2, prices rise to relatively high levels early in the life of the asset, suggesting speculation on an impending repetition of the pattern of the previous market.
Individuals demand more of the asset, pushing up prices, based on the belief that prices will follow a similar trajectory as in the prior market. Afterward, prices begin to decline before the period of peak prices in the preceding market, suggesting that individuals anticipate a peak to occur at roughly the same time in market 2 as has previously occurred in market 1, and supply units to the market before the time at which they anticipate a decline in prices. Thus, the dynamic pattern from one market to the next is consistent with the idea that the change in the price trajectory from one market to the next within a session reflects (a) expectations of a repetition of the price time series that occurred in the prior market, in conjunction with (b) the use of profitable strategies given those expectations.
14 To explore whether this backward propagation of prices is a feature of the overall data, we test whether changes in prices in period t, between one market to the next, can be explained by the difference between the previous market's prices in period 1 t + relative to period t . Consider the following regression specifications:
Here, p m,t is the price in period t of market m (indices for session and treatment are suppressed for expositional clarity). The rationale for this specification is the following. Suppose a trader believes that prices in the current market will be the same as those in the previous market.
Then, if prices in the prior market m-1 increased between periods t and t+1 ( and t+1 in the previous market affects the period t price in the current market. Equation (4a) considers the effect for absolute price levels and (4b) for deviations of prices from fundamentals.
15
[ The results of the regression, presented in Table 4 , suggest that behavior is consistent with a certain amount of response to beliefs that previous price patterns will be repeated. 
V. CONCLUSION
We construct experimental markets to obtain the first empirical observations, from a controlled laboratory study, of the behavior of asset markets that experience a peak or a trough in fundamentals. We focus on how well the market tracks the fundamental value, how well it reflects trends in fundamentals, and how well it reveals the timing of a change in trend. We also consider how these measures of pricing accuracy evolve as traders gain more experience through repetition of the market. The results are not obvious a priori in light of the strong tendency of experimental asset markets to generate bubbles and crashes when traders are inexperienced, a result that nonetheless has only been established for assets with fundamental values that are monotonically decreasing or constant over time.
We observe that mispricing relative to fundamental values is typical in markets populated Thus, we find a strong difference between the price efficiency of a market when the underlying fundamentals rise to a peak and then decline, and that of a market where the fundamentals decline to a trough and experience a subsequent increase. In the Peak treatment, while the market experiences bubbles and crashes when traders are inexperienced, the markets operate at close to fundamentals after participants have acquired experience in the environment.
On the other hand, a trough in fundamentals appears to represent a more challenging environment for the market to achieve price efficiency. Prices consistently fail to reflect the level, the direction of the trend, and the timing of the turnaround of fundamentals in the Valley treatment. The Valley treatment is the first experimental environment of which we are aware, in which asset markets populated by individuals with this level of experience with a stationary environment, do not track fundamental values closely.
There is considerable debate in the economics profession about the extent to which markets produce prices that reflect underlying fundamental values. The evidence we obtain here, from ten experimental sessions, suggests that the answer may be that it depends on the properties of the process underlying fundamental values and the dynamics the process exhibits over time.
We identify a strong asymmetry between how asset markets respond to peaks and troughs in fundamentals. This occurs even though the treatments are constructed to be similar in the level of complexity, in the monetary stakes involved, in the institutional structure, and in the characteristics of the individuals participating. Indeed, there may also be characteristics of the time path of fundamentals, other than whether they exhibit peaks and troughs, that enhance or impede the ability of a market to track fundamentals. Our research indicates that characteristics of the fundamental value, in addition to the well-known influences of the institutional structure and the level of sophistication of traders, are determinants of price efficiency. While this is clearly a property of the laboratory markets we study, it may also be a feature of markets outside the laboratory. If so, it suggests a conjecture that the tendency of markets to conform more closely to some trajectories of fundamentals than others might potentially reconcile differing conclusions on the extent to which asset markets display price efficiency. 
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.0238 t' -t* In the table, the measures are reported for each market within each session. The table also includes averages across sessions for each treatment, as well as between session standard deviations.
Finally, Table A3 contains the results of an analysis of the differences between treatments of each of the measures defined above. The tables report, for each measure and in each market, the significance level at which the hypothesis that the values for both treatments are drawn from the same population can be rejected. 
Appendix B: Experiment Instructions and Screen Displays
This appendix contains the instructions handed out to subjects and two screenshots of the trading program in action. Treatment-specific information is contained inside curly braces { } for the Peak treatment and square brackets [ ] for sessions V3-V5 of the Valley treatment (information for V1-V2 is omitted, as it is very similar to the information in V3-V5).
---BEGIN INSTRUCTIONS ---
General Instructions
This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment consists of a sequence of trading Periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The currency used in the market is francs. All trading will be done in terms of francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in Euros. The conversion rate is: 200 francs to 1 Euro.
How to use the computerized market
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the current Period. The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. In the center of your screen you see the current Period and the amount of Money you have available to buy Shares. To the left of the screen, you see the number of Shares you currently have.
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled "Enter offer to sell:" in the second column. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share, and then select "Submit Offer To Sell".
Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate space, and then click on the field labelled "Submit Offer To Sell". You will notice that nine numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the third column from the left, entitled "Offers To Sell". The lowest ask price will always be on the bottom of that list and will, by default, be selected. You can select a different offer by clicking on it. If you select "Buy", the button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share for the currently selected sell price.
Please purchase a share now by selecting "Buy". Since each of you had offered to sell a share and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started out with. This is because you bought one share and sold one share.
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a share, your Money increases by the price of the sale. You may make an offer to buy a unit by selecting "Submit offer to buy." Please do so now. Type a number in the text area "Enter offer to buy." Then press the red button labelled "Submit Offer To Buy". You can sell to the person who submitted the highest offer to buy if you click on "Sell". Please do so now.
In the middle column, labelled "Transaction Prices", you can see the prices at which Shares have been bought and sold in this period.
You will now have 10 minutes to buy and sell shares. This is a practice period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not influence your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the practice period is to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully submitted offers to buy and offers to sell. Also be sure that you the money you begin with + any dividends you receive -any taxes you pay + any money you receive from sales of shares -any money you spend on purchases of shares.
6. Beginning the experiment -From now on your decisions will count toward your earnings, so please think carefully before making them.
----END INSTRUCTIONS --- 
